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We study the relationship between group size and the extent of risk sharing in an 
insurance game played over a number of periods with random idiosyncratic and 
aggregate shocks to income in each period. Risk sharing is attained via agents that 
receive a high endowment in one period making unilateral transfers to agents that receive 
a low endowment in that period. The complete risk sharing allocation is for all agents to 
place their endowments in a common pool, which is then shared equally among members 
of the group in every period. Theoretically, the larger the group size, the smaller the per 
capita dispersion in consumption and greater is the potential value of insurance. Field 
evidence however suggests that smaller groups do better than larger groups as far as risk 
sharing is concerned. Results from our experiments show that the extent of mutual 
insurance is significantly higher in smaller groups, though contributions to the pool are 
never close to what complete risk sharing requires.    
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1: Introduction 
Economic theory suggests that in a homogeneous population, the larger the population 
the higher is the per capita utility from risk sharing (see for example Genicot and Ray, 
2003 and other references cited there). This implies that in the absence of any other 
impediments to group formation, a Pareto optimal solution to risk sharing, for risk averse 
agents, would be to form as large a group as possible.  
On the other hand, field evidence has shown that smaller groups do better than 
larger groups with respect to risk sharing. For example, there are a large number of 
papers that test for full consumption insurance at the village (community) level in 
developing countries. All of these papers reject complete risk-sharing at the level of the 
community and find evidence of only partial insurance. However there is evidence 
suggesting that risk sharing actually occurs within smaller groups rather than at the level 
of the community as a whole. For example Morduch (1991) and Grimard (1997) find risk 
sharing within people of the same caste in India and people of the same ethnicity in 
CoteD’Ivoire. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) find evidence of gifts and transfers among a 
network of friends and relatives in response to income shocks in rural Philippines. 
Murgai, Winters, Sadoulet and De Janvry (2002) investigate water transfers among 
households along a water-course in the Punjab province in Pakistan and find that 
reciprocal exchanges are localized in units smaller than the entire water course 
community. It therefore appears that while the larger groups are unable to fully insure 
households against income fluctuations, smaller sub-groups are doing a better job of it.   
How do we reconcile the theoretical predictions relating to risk sharing and the 
evidence from the field? One way is to take into account other considerations like   2
informational decay or costs to group formation that increase with the size of the group 
that ultimately affect large groups. However in arguing that smaller groups perform 
better than larger groups in the field, we are comparing across groups, and in a sense 
comparing apples and oranges. When we compare a group of size  1 n  in community  X  to 
a group of size  2 n  in community Y  with  12 nn <  we are essentially comparing across 
different institutions and that might be contaminating the results. To be able to conclude 
that the extent of risk sharing is greater in smaller groups we need to hold the 
institutional arrangement fixed and then vary the size of the group within that institution. 
This is difficult, if not impossible, to do using data from the field. Economic 
experiments, on the other hand, provide us with a unique opportunity to examine the 
impact of group size on risk-sharing. Experiments allow us to control for the institution 
(defined by the experimental design and the parameters) and then vary the size of the 
group. The relationship between group size and the extent of insurance would then no 
longer be contaminated by variations in institutions.  
In this paper, we use an insurance game to compare the behaviour of small 
groups (with 5 members) with that of large groups (with 25 members). We implement a 
multi-period game, where in each period subjects in both small and large groups get 
either a high or a low endowment with equal probability. Apart from this individual level 
risk, subjects also experience an aggregate uncertainty with the number of people who 
get a high or a low endowment varying from one period to the next depending on a 
random draw. Subjects can fully insure their earnings against individual uncertainty by 
placing their entire endowment into a group account in each period with the total amount   3
in the group account being distributed equally among all group members.
1  Note that here 
subjects face two different kinds of uncertainty – the endowment uncertainty arising from 
the random nature of the endowment stream over their lifetime and the strategic 
uncertainty arising from uncertainty regarding the behaviour of the other members of the 
group (in terms of contributions to the pool) once the shock has been realized.  
While this kind of a common insurance fund is a nice theoretical construct, how 
“real” is it? There are instances of this kind of insurance funds being set up in response to 
shocks. An example is the Koran study groups (Pengajian) in many parts of Indonesia. 
Agents choose the amount (as a proportion of their income) to contribute to the 
Pengajian and the pool is then divided among the contributors. Chen (2005) argues that 
the  Pengajians played an important role in insuring households at the time of the 
Indonesian financial crisis. The mutual insurance scheme in this case is designed as 
follows: agents receive a shock and after the realization of the shock they choose a 
fraction of their income to put in the Pengajian (and keep the rest for themselves). The 
Pengajian budget is immediately divided according to a pre-determined transfer rule. 
The transfer rule employed in these Pengajians is however different from the one we use 
in this paper.
2     
Our results show that contributions to the group account are significantly lower in 
the large groups compared to the small groups. However contribution levels are never 
close to what the complete risk sharing equilibrium in this insurance game predicts. One 
                                                 
1 They cannot insure against aggregate uncertainty: in a bad aggregate state, the total amount available for 
sharing is less.    
2 The typical size of the Pengajian varies depending on the size of the village, the number of Muslims and 
the number of Imams. Chen (2005) finds that in 1998, the average Pengajian participation in the village 
was 61%.   4
possible explanation is that agents are myopic and fail to fully realize the benefits of 
contributing to the pool when they receive a high endowment. While the long run 
benefits of contributing to the pool can be substantial, the short run returns less so and 
more importantly the short term returns are lower in large groups.  
  Given that contributions to the pool fall short of the complete risk sharing 
outcome, we next explore alternative environments that might encourage more 
contributions to the pool and hence result in greater mutual insurance and risk sharing. 
We examine this issue by focusing exclusively on groups of size 5 and introducing the 
following treatment variations: (1) we increase the probability of receiving a low 
endowment; (2) we remove the aggregate uncertainty by guaranteeing that in each period 
there will be a fixed number of high and low endowment subjects; and (3) we increase 
the level of inequality so that the difference in endowments is higher between high and 
low endowment subjects. These treatments improve our understanding of the behaviour 
of subjects, with respect to risk sharing, when they face different parameters.  
  We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework which 
forms the basis of our experiment. Section 3 presents an overview of the experimental 
design. Section 4 contains our main results. Section 5 has a discussion of the results and 
makes some concluding remarks. 
 
2: Theoretical Framework 
Consider a community of n identical agents engaged in the production and consumption 
of a perishable good at each time period t. Each agent receives a random income that 
takes on two values h (with probability  p ) and l  (with probability 1 p − ) with   5
0 hl >>. Income realizations are independent and identical both over individuals and 
also over time periods. There is full information – all agents know the realization of the 
shock. Each agent has the same utility function that is increasing, smooth and strictly 
concave in consumption. This is a classical group insurance problem. Mutual insurance 
requires that once the shock is realized, agents that receive a high endowment make 
unilateral transfers to agents that receive a low endowment. Risk sharing is obtained 
because of reciprocal behaviour on the part of agents. The framework that we use here 
follows Genicot and Ray (2003).  
  Since each agent draws independently, the aggregate resource in the economy is 
given by 
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Expected utility (in any given period) under complete risk sharing outcome
3, attained by 
dividing the aggregate resource available at each period equally among all members of 
the community, is 
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3 This is also the symmetric Pareto optimal outcome.    6
  It follows immediately that the larger the group size the smaller the dispersion of 
per capita output and the larger the potential value of insurance. The expected utility 
under autarky (where each agent consumes what he/she draws in each period) is given by  
  () ( )( ) 1
A EU p uh pul ≡+ − .         ( 2 )  
  How does risk sharing work within the group? Once the shock is realized agents 
contribute a share of their income to a common pool. The pool is then distributed among 
members of the group according to a pre-determined transfer rule. The transfer scheme is 
implemented as follows: suppose that an agent k  with a good draw contributes 
h
k t  and 
each agent with a bad draw contributes 
l
k t ;  0, , ,
ii
kk tw i h l ⎡⎤ ∈= ⎣⎦  where 
i
k w  denotes the 
endowment of agent k  in state i. Total contribution then is  ( )
hl
kk kt n k t +−  and this is 
divided equally among all agents, irrespective of whether the agent receives a high 
endowment or not and whether she contributed or not. So the utility of an agent with a 
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.  The expected utility from this transfer scheme is given by: 
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.  Note that once the shock is realized, there is 
always an incentive for the individuals with a high draw to deviate (and contribute 0),   7
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. But the expected utility from 
contributing, assuming that agents are risk averse, is always higher than the expected 
utility under autarky. 
  Each player knows her own endowment and the total number of high (or low) 
draws in the community.  We can then compare the actual extent of risk sharing with 
what should happen under complete risk sharing. The type of risk sharing mechanism 
being implemented here (and by extension those in many field situations) is essentially 
based on mutual obligation and reciprocity, given that there is no commitment or 
enforceability.
4 There is no punishment for “cheating” via non-contribution in the event 
of receiving a high draw. The only potential consequence is the loss of faith by other 
group members who in turn might respond by not putting anything into the group 
account when they get high draws in turn.  
 
2.1: Hypotheses 
We test several hypotheses relating to individual behaviour in terms of risk sharing. The 
first hypothesis examines group size and contributions to the pool and attempts to 
reconcile the differences between theoretical predictions relating to the size of the group 
and empirical observations. Hypothesis 1: Agents in large groups contribute more to the 
pool (as a proportion of their endowment in the period) compared to agents in small 
groups.  
                                                 
4 These models have been categorized under the broad heading of models of risk sharing without 
commitment. Coate and Ravallion (1993) originally coined this term and there has since been a large 
volume of work that examines various aspects of this issue, both theoretically and empirically. See for 
example Genicot and Ray (2003).    8
Mutual obligation and reciprocity implies that agents with a high endowment 
would voluntarily transfer some of their resources to those who are less fortunate (agents 
that receive low endowment). Of course it must be noted that while this reciprocal 
behaviour is consistent with risk sharing and risk aversion on the part of economic agents 
(endowments are uncertain and those with high endowment contribute more to the pool 
today, hoping that they would in turn be the beneficiary of voluntary contribution by 
some others when they have a low endowment), it could also be the result of altruistic 
behaviour or inequality aversion on the part of agents. Becker (1974) models a utility 
function that is comprised of two elements: the agent’s own wealth and the wealth of 
other members of the group. Utility increases as the agent’s wealth increases and as the 
wealth of the other group members increases.  This model predicts that individuals with a 
high endowment will contribute more, in an absolute sense, to the pool than individuals 
with a low endowment.  The second type of model is inequity-aversion. Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) use a utility function where utility decreases (asymmetrically) when an 
agent earns either more or less than the average group payoff.  Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000) use a utility function that combines self-interest with a concern for relative 
standing.  These models have the same predictions in our setting. Hence irrespective of 
which behavioural pattern (reciprocity, altruism or inequity aversion) motivates them, 
individuals with higher income or wealth should contribute a larger share of their income 
to the pool (i.e., do more risk sharing) than those with lower income or wealth.  So the 
second hypothesis we test is: Hypothesis 2: Agents with high endowment contribute more 
to the pool compared to agents with low endowments. 
   9
2.2: Previous Experimental Literature 
Prior experimental work on risk sharing is quite limited. Charness and Genicot (2004) in 
a paper that is closest to the spirit of this paper (in that they also test for risk sharing, but 
do so in a different game) examine the issue of risk sharing without commitment by 
choosing a simple framework in which one of the two paired agents, selected at random 
in each period, receives an amount of money h in addition to his or her fixed income. 
After observing the interim incomes, this player chooses a non-negative transfer to his or 
her partner. Participants face the same variance in income but do not necessarily have the 
same mean income. They find strong evidence of risk sharing in the laboratory. In 
particular they find that (1) beliefs matter, in the sense that how actual transfers compare 
to expected transfers plays an important role in later transfers; and (2) reciprocity is 
important: the higher the first transfer made by an individual’s partner within a match, 
the higher the individual’s transfer, particularly upon receiving a good shock.  
Bone, Hey and Suckling (2004) conduct an experiment to test whether pairs of 
individuals are able to exploit the ex ante efficiency gains in the sharing of a risky 
financial prospect. They argue that fairness is not a significant consideration and find that 
having to choose between different prospects diverts partners from allocating the chosen 
prospect efficiently.  
Barr (2003) conducted one shot risk sharing games among villagers in rural 
Zimbabwe who were observed to share risk with each other. She finds that more extrinsic 
commitment is associated with more risk pooling but more information is actually 
associated with less risk pooling.    10
  The structure of our insurance game is similar to a linear public goods game with 
the distinctions that not all subjects get the same endowment, the endowments are 
uncertain from one period to the next and contributions to the common pool are not 
increased by a multiplicative factor greater than one as in a voluntary contributions 
mechanism. There are also similarities between our insurance game and the “solidarity 
game” studied by Selten and Ockenfels (1998). The solidarity game is played by three-
person groups where each player could earn DM 10.00 with 2/3 probability. Before the 
outcome of the game is known each subject has to decide how much he is willing to give 
to either one or two losers in the group in the event of winning the lottery.
5  
 
3: Experimental Design 
160 subjects participated in the experiment. These are undergraduate and post-graduate 
students from Monash University and the University of Melbourne.   
  Each session consists of two parts. In the first part subjects fill out a questionnaire 
designed to elicit their risk preferences. For this part, participants were presented with ten 
lotteries (referred to as choice games in the instructions given to the subjects).
6  Each 
lottery involved a choice between two options. Option A always yielded $5.00 with 
                                                 
5 Selten and Ockenfels (1998, p. 518) comment: “Solidarity means a willingness to help people in need 
who are similar to oneself but victims of outside influences such as unforeseen illness, natural catastrophes, 
etc. To some extent solidarity is similar to reciprocity, a motivation which urges you to give something in 
exchange for something you have received, even if you are not compelled to give anything. However, 
solidarity is different. Gifts are made but not reciprocated. They are made to recipients who presumably, if 
one were in need oneself, would have made a gift to oneself. Solidarity aims at a reciprocal relationship, 
but a more subtle one than giving after one has received.” 
6 Lotteries have been often used to experimentally elicit risk preferences from subjects. The choice 
between a risky and a safe choice that we have used in this paper follows Brown and Stewart (1999). Holt 
and Laury (2002) use two lotteries, one more risky than the other. The advantage of Holt and Laury (2002) 
is that it provides a “finer grid” of risk preferences but it has the disadvantage of being more complicated 
and time consuming, particularly given that this was not the main focus of our paper.    11
certainty. Option B was risky and paid either $10.00 or $0.00 (see Appendix A) with the 
probability of winning $10.00 changing (in 10% increments) from 10% on the first 
lottery to 100% on the tenth lottery. Lottery 10 (where Option B paid $10.00 with 
certainty) was included to ensure consistency (ideally every agent should choose Option 
B in the 10
th game). The participants were told that only one of the ten lotteries would 
actually be played. The chosen lottery would be determined by drawing a numbered ball 
from a cage after all participants had completed their choices.
7 The number on the ball 
would signify which one of the ten games would be played. Once the lottery had been 
determined, the actual payment for Option B (either $10.00 or $0.00) was obtained by 
drawing a ball numbered between 1 and 10 from the number cage. For example, in the 
first lottery, Option B would pay $10.00 if the number on the ball was 1 and $0 if any 
other number was chosen. In the ninth lottery Option B paid $10.00 if any number 
between 1 and 9 was chosen and $0 if the number on the ball was 10. Thus, choosing 
Option B was considerably more risky in the first lottery than in the ninth. The 
experimenter collected the responses after all participants finished. The participants were 
told that their earnings from this game would be determined after the completion of the 
second game (the insurance game, which was the primary focus of our analysis). They 
were also told that their decisions in this experiment would have no bearing on the 
second experiment.  
                                                 
7 The choice of the lottery was done after the insurance game was played. The participants of course had to 
make their choices before the insurance game.    12
The participant's pattern of choices provided an ordinal measure of their risk 
attitude in this context.
8 Risk aversion is represented by the convexity or concavity of an 
individual's utility function when faced with the choice between an uncertain payoff and 
a safe bet. One way to assess the convexity or concavity of this function is to find the bet 
at which the participant is indifferent between the safe and risky option. In the present 
context this point is represented by the lottery at which the participant switches from 
choosing Option A to Option B. Individuals who switched from Option A to Option B 
after Game 5 are coded as being risk averse, those that switched before Game 5 are risk 
lovers and those who switch at Game 5 are risk neutral.
9  
Once the lottery choices had been made subjects moved on to the insurance game 
which was conducted using the ZTREE software (Fischbacher, 1999). Each group played 
the game for at least 20 periods and the end period was randomly determined by 
throwing a six sided die. After the 20
th period, the experiment continued for an additional 
period with a probability of  5
6  and the experiment stopped as soon as a “6” was rolled. 
At the beginning of each period the subjects were informed about their endowment for 
that period, which could be either high or low.
10 A high endowment was 100 tokens and 
a low endowment was 20 tokens in all treatments except the increased inequality 
                                                 
8 While this way of assessing risk attitudes has the advantage of being simple to administer and easy for 
subjects to understand, one needs to remember that it is not clear to what extent people are more risk-
seeking in one domain yet more risk-averse in another, relative to other participants. Furthermore, it is 
unclear to what extent risk assessments are sensitive to the ordering in which the games are presented. 
Since risk attitudes were used here only as a covariate (and not as an absolute measure of the riskiness of 
the population), we ignore those issues.  
9 In Game 5, lottery B pays $10.00 if the number picked is 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 and $0.00 if the number picked is 
6, 7, 8, 9 or 10.  
10 The endowments were generated using a uniform distribution. If the number (drawn at random) was 
greater than 0.5, the subject received a high endowment and if less than 0.5 the subject received a low 
endowment.   13
treatment where the high endowment was 200 tokens. Subjects did not know the exact 
endowments of the other members of the group but they were told how many players in 
the group received a high endowment in that period. The subjects then had to decide how 
many tokens to contribute to the pool. The language used in the instructions did not use 
the term contribution – rather the subjects were asked to allocate tokens to either a group 
account or a private account (see Appendix A for a sample of the instructions). Tokens 
placed in the group account were added up and divided equally among the group 
members. At the end of each round the players received the following feedback: the total 
number of tokens contributed to the group account and their earnings for that round. The 
subjects could track their earnings on a personal record sheet.  Table 1 presents the 
parameters in the different treatments. Each session lasted around 45 minutes (including 
the lottery game) and the average payoff for the experiment was AUD 24.  
  The large group sessions (with 25 subjects) were essentially replications of the 





st subjects were clones of the 1





nd subjects were clones of the 2
nd subject and so on. The reason we 
did this was to ensure that the proportion of subjects who had high endowments did not 
change across treatments. The subjects were however not informed of this pattern of 
endowments.   
 
4: Results 
We begin with an overview of the risk attitudes of the subjects. Figure 1 presents the 
histogram of the choice where the participants switched from the risk free Option A to   14
the risky Option B. It is clear that the majority (62.5%) of the subjects are risk averse in 
the sense that they switch from Option A to Option B in Game 6 or later, 20% of the 
subjects are risk neutral (switch from Option A to Option B in Game 5) and the 
remaining (17.5%) of the subjects are risk lovers (switch prior to Game 5).
11    
  Next we look at the behaviour in the insurance game. We start by examining 
some descriptive statistics. Panel A in Table 2 presents the average proportion 
contributed and the absolute amount contributed to the pool in each of the treatments. 
Panel B in Table 2 presents the average behaviour over time. It shows that, not 
surprisingly, in every treatment the average proportion contributed falls over time. 
Average proportion contributed is nearly 40% in period 1 in the baseline sessions and it 
goes down to 15% in the 20
th period and down to around 3% after the 20
th period. A 
similar pattern is obtained for all of the other treatments.
12   
  Figure 2 presents the histogram of proportion contributed to the pool for the 
different treatments. The majority of the subjects contribute 0 and the percentage 
contributing 0 varies from 73 percent in the large group sessions to 49 percent in the 
increased inequality sessions. Likewise the proportion contributing the maximum (10) 
varies from 9 percent in the baseline sessions to around 2 percent in the high probability 
of low endowment sessions. In Figure 3 we present the average proportion contributed 
(Panel A) and average contribution (in absolute terms, in Panel B) in each treatment by 
endowment type. While subjects with high endowment contribute less to the pool as a 
                                                 
11 21 of the 160 subjects either did not switch or kept switching between Options A and B. We defined 
their switch as the game where they switched from Option A to B for the first time. For those that always 
chose Option A, we coded their switch at Game 10.  
12 In the Selten and Ockenfels (1998) solidarity game, members of three-person groups promise, that in the 
event of winning the lottery, they would give on average 24.6% of the $10.00 prize to the loser if there is 
only one loser in the group or 15.6% to each of two losers in the group.    15
proportion of their endowment, in terms of absolute contributions high endowment 
subjects contribute more.  
 
4.1: Econometric Analysis 
The first issue that we wish to examine in this paper is whether the size of the group 
matters. Accordingly we start by analysing the baseline sessions (with 5 subjects in each) 
and the large group sessions (with 25 subjects in each). We have 80 players across the 
two treatments, each playing the game for at least 20 periods (in most cases more) giving 
us a total of 1685 observations. We estimate the proportion of their endowment that 
individuals contribute to the group account using a random effects Tobit regression (to 
take into account the unobserved player specific heterogeneity and the upper and lower 
censoring) and the actual contribution to the group account using a random effects GLS 
regression (to take into account the unobserved player specific heterogeneity).
13  
  Table 3 presents the regression results to examine the group size effects: column 
2 presents the random effects Tobit regression results for proportion contributed to the 
group account and column 3 presents the random effects GLS regression for contribution 
to the group account.
14 The explanatory variables included are: (1) the inverse of time 
() 1
t  that allows us to capture the non-linearity in the effect of time on contributions and 
also allows us to distinguish between the effects of early and later rounds on 
                                                 
13 When we try to estimate the absolute contribution using a random effect Tobit regression, we face a 
problem with the upper censoring, which is endowment specific. We did estimate the random effect Tobit 
model for absolute contribution where we account only for lower censoring. These estimates are available 
on request.  
14 We also computed the pooled Tobit regressions with player fixed effects and the random effect GLS 
regression for proportion contributed to the group account. These results are similar and available on 
request.    16
contributions; (2) a treatment dummy for the large group; (3) a dummy for whether the 
player received a high or low endowment in that period; (4) the aggregate state in the 
period, which is captured by three dummies to control for the fraction of low types in that 
period: fraction of the group receiving low endowment = 0.4 (i.e., 2 out of the 5 members 
receive low endowments), fraction of the group receiving low endowment = 0.6 (i.e., 3 
out of the 5 members receive low endowments) and fraction of the group receiving low 
endowment = 0.8 (i.e., 4 out of the 5 members receive low endowments);
15 (5) two 
variables that capture the dynamics of contribution:  proportion contributed by player i 
in period  1 t −  () ,1 it p −  and the proportion of total endowment placed in the public pool by 


















, where  ,1 it c −  is the contribution of player 
i in period t and  ,1 it w −  is the endowment of player i in period t. Remember that 
contributing to the pool is essentially based on the notion of reciprocity and mutual 
obligation. In each period, players know the number of high types in the group, so they 
know the total endowment for the group as a whole. So the proportion of the total 
endowment placed in the pool could therefore be viewed as an indicator of the 
reciprocity of the other members of the group and it is quite likely that players will use 
this information to determine their contributions.  (6) A dummy for risk averse agents 
(which takes the value of one if the player switched from Option A to Option B in Game 
6 or later and zero otherwise) obtained from the choice of gambles by each agent; (7) 
Finally we also collected demographic information on the subjects and we include two 
                                                 
15 The reference category is that the fraction of the group receiving low endowment = 0.2. Also there were 
no groups with 0 low types or all low types.    17
dummies: male and Economics/Commerce/Business major. For the regressions for 
contribution to the group account we account for dynamics in the behaviour of agents by 
including in the set of explanatory variables the contribution by the particular player to 
the group account in the previous period ( ) ,1 it c −  and the total contributions to the group 
in the previous period by the group as a whole.
16 
  The following results are worth noting. First, contributions fall over time. As t 
increases  1
t  decreases and this is associated with a reduction in contributions and hence 
the positive (and statistically significant) coefficient associated with  1
t .  
  Second, both the proportion contributed and the actual amount contributed to the 
public pool is significantly lower in the larger groups. Hypothesis 1 is therefore not 
supported by the data. The question is why are contributions lower in larger groups?  
Typically it has been argued that costs to group formation and other informational 
problems result in less cohesive behaviour in larger groups. In this laboratory set-up there 
are no costs to group formation and also there are no informational asymmetries per se. 
Does it then mean that subjects in the large groups are less reciprocal? That would be an 
unsatisfactory explanation because subjects were randomly allocated into one of the two 
groups.  
                                                 
16 A problem with including the lagged dependent variable pi,t-1 or ci,t-1, in the set of explanatory variables 
is that it could be correlated with the unobserved component of the error term. Statistically the consistency 
of the corresponding random effects GLS estimator depends on the size of t (the time component): for 
large t, it is consistent but might be biased, though the bias decreases with t (see for example Baltagi, 
2001). To obtain unbiased and consistent estimates, we computed the non-linear Generalized Method of 
Moments (Arellano and Bond, 1991) estimator, though we were not able to account for censoring. Given 
that t is at least 20 in our sample, we present and discuss the standard random effects regression results. 
The non-linear Generalized Method of Moments estimation results are similar and are available on request. 
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One explanation for the relative lack of success of the larger groups might be 
along the following lines. In each period, once the income shock has been realized, each 
player faces the choice of making a contribution  } , 0 { c c j ∈  to the common pool where a 
contribution of  c c j =  (the endowment for that period) will lead to a Pareto optimal 
outcome. However there is considerable uncertainty about the contributions of the other 
1 n−  players. Let us define the cumulative distribution function for player j’s action as 
() j Fc . In the Pareto optimal outcome  1 ) ( = c F  and  ( ) 0 j Fc =  for  c c j < . If { } 1,, n cc …  
are independently and identically distributed with common cumulative distribution 
function  () i Fc , then the cumulative distribution function for the minimum contribution 
n
j c F c F )] ( 1 [ 1 ) ( min − − = . In the Pareto optimal outcome  ) ( min c F equals 0 for  c c j < . But 
suppose that a player is uncertain that the other  1 n−  players will choose the action ( ) c  
commensurate with the Pareto optimal outcome. Specifically, let  ) 0 ( F  be small but 
greater than zero, then as n goes to infinity  ) 0 ( min F  goes to 1. When the number of 
players is large, it only takes a remote possibility that an individual player will not 
choose to contribute c to motivate defection from the Pareto optimal outcome. Van 
Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) use a similar explanation in discussing the issue of 
equilibrium selection from a set of Pareto ranked equilibria.  
  We have noted above that there are similarities in the structure of our insurance 
game and a linear public goods game. As far as the latter game is concerned, Isaac and 
Walker (1988), using groups of 4 and 10, find that holding group size constant 
contributions to the public account are lower when the per capita return (the return to an   19
individual from transferring an additional $1 from his private account to the public 
account holding the contributions of other group members constant) from the public good 
is lower. However they also find that holding the per capita return constant, increasing 
the group size does not lead to lower contributions. The latter finding about group size is 
reinforced by Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994) who look at groups of 4, 10, 40 and 
100. They find that with a per capita return of 0.30, groups of 40 and 100 contribute more 
to the public account than groups of 4 and 10 and when the per capita return is 0.75 there 
is no difference in contributions across the various group sizes. It is not straight-forward 
to extrapolate from these linear public goods game results to our insurance game results. 
In our game, since contributions are not multiplied, an increase in group size leads to a 
decrease in the per capita return. In the short run, any amount placed in the group account 
yields a return of  1
n where n is the group size, while amount placed in the private 
account yields a return of 1 and it is possible that this reduction in the per capita return is 
driving the result that contributions to the pool are significantly lower in the larger 
groups. But contrary to the Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994) result that larger groups 
are more cooperative and actually achieve greater efficiency for some values of the per 
capita return, we find that the larger groups in our insurance game are consistently less 
cooperative and less efficient than the smaller groups.
17 
                                                 
17 Yet another reason for the low levels of contribution to the pool could be because the subjects did not 
fully “understand” the game and this led to them not choosing the optimal strategy. We implemented a 
communication mechanism which involved an announcement made by the experimenter to examine if 
clarifying the nature of the problem would change subject behaviour. (See, for instance, Van Huyck, 
Gillette and Battalio, 1992, who study a coordination game and Seely, Van Huyck and Battalio, 2003, who 
look at a public goods game). We ran three additional sessions with 5 subjects in each where we added the 
following sentences to the instructions: Remember that your endowments are uncertain. You may get a 
high or a low endowment in a particular period followed by a high or a low endowment in the period after 
that and so on. So think of your income over the different time periods in the experiments and not just the   20
 Third,  players  receiving  high endowment contribute to the pool significantly 
more in absolute terms but less in terms of the proportion of their endowment. 
Hypothesis 2 is therefore supported by the data. Our results however do not support the 
strong version of the inequity aversion model (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 and Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000) where agents are concerned with relative standing and predict that 
individuals with higher income or wealth should contribute a larger share of their income 
to the public good than those with lower income or wealth. Our results show that the 
opposite is true – individuals with lower income actually place a larger share of their 
income to the pool.
18 The weak version of the inequity aversion hypothesis is accepted 
since the absolute contributions of the high endowment subjects are significantly higher 
(column 5) and do lead to an increase of the income of the low endowment subjects, 
hence the behaviour of the rich helps in reducing inequality. The fact that absolute levels 
of contributions to the pool are significantly higher for agents with high endowment 
suggests that Becker’s model of altruism can explain part of the behaviour of the 
subjects. 
  Does the aggregate state in the period have an effect? The Random Effects Tobit 
regression results show that the proportion contributed is significantly lower when there 
are a larger number of subjects with low endowment in the group but the aggregate state 
in the period does not have a statistically significant effect on actual contributions.  
                                                                                                                                                 
current period, when you make your decision. We compared the contributions in the first period in this 
treatment to those in the baseline sessions and found that, making this announcement did not increase 
contributions to the pool even in the first period. We do not include this data from these three sessions in 
any of the econometric analyses carried out above.   
18 Buckley and Croson (2003) in a public good experiment find that those receiving a low endowment 
contribute more to the pool (as a proportion of their endowment) compared to those receiving a high 
endowment. In their paper subjects within the same group had different endowments, but there was no 
uncertainty regarding the endowment: some members of the group received a low endowment every period 
while the others received a high endowment every period.    21
  The proportion contributed by player i in the previous period ( ) ,1 it p −  does not 
have a statistically significant effect on proportion contributed to the pool in the index 
period. However when we look at absolute contributions, we find that there is a 
statistically significant lagged effect. The proportion of total endowment contributed to 
the pool in the previous period by the whole group ( ) 1 t π −  on the other hand has a 
statistically significant effect on proportion contributed to the pool in the index period. 
  It is interesting to note that proportion contributed (but not the absolute amount) 
is significantly lower for risk-averse agents. A priori we cannot be sure what the effect of 
individual level risk aversion on contributions to the group account will be. On the one 
hand, sharing of the endowment (through higher contributions to the pool) is essentially a 
means of insuring against fluctuations in income and one would expect risk averse agents 
to contribute more to the pool (the endowment uncertainty effect). On the other hand 
risk-averse agents may contribute less as they might think that contributing is risky as the 
other members may not reciprocate in future periods and they would be more averse to 
be taken advantage of (the strategic uncertainty effect). It therefore appears that the 
strategic uncertainty is stronger than the endowment uncertainty in terms of its effects on 
contributions to the pool. Finally, contribution levels are significantly lower for 
Business/Economics/Commerce majors.
19 
                                                 
19 We also collected data on a number of other demographic characteristics of the subjects and it is worth 
examining the effect of these additional demographic characteristics on contribution levels. We included 
the following additional demographic controls (dummies): eldest child, only child, whether born in 
Australia, whether went to high school in Australia, whether parents live in Australia and whether the 
subject resided in a big city or a suburb near a big city when aged 15. The results are robust to the addition 
of these demographic controls (the regression results are available on request): only the risk aversion 
dummy now loses its statistical significance. Turning to these new demographic controls, we see that 
contributions to the pool are lower if parents live in Australia and if the subject is the eldest child while 
contributions to the pool are higher if the subject was born in Australia and went to school in Australia.     22
  We further explore the observation that contributions are low in large groups 
(evidence that does not support Hypothesis 1) by suggesting that in a large group subjects 
feel that they can hide behind the veil of anonymity more easily compared to subjects in 
a small group since the actual contribution levels of each player is never made public. 
Subjects could perceive that the strategic uncertainty is greater in large groups compared 
to that in small groups, given the endowment risk, which is constant across the two 
groups. To examine this issue we re-estimated the contribution regressions (both in terms 
of proportion and in terms of absolute amounts) by stratifying the sample by group size. 
The random effects Tobit regression results show that the coefficient of  1 t π −  is positive 
and statistically significant for the baseline treatment and is positive but not statistically 
significant for the large group treatment (this regression result is not presented in the 
paper but is available on request). So it is clear that in the small groups, subjects respond 
much more to increased contributions to the group as a whole. To pursue this line of 
argument further, we re-estimated these same set of regressions but now instead of using 
1 t π −  as an explanatory variable, we used  111 it t it p π − −− ∆ =−. So   1 it− ∆  measures the 
deviation of subject i’s contribution from the group average.  1 0 it− ∆ ≤  implies that the 
proportion of his/her endowment contributed to the pool in period  1 t −  by subject i is at 
least equal to the proportion of the total endowment contributed to the pool by the group 
as a whole and  1 0 it− ∆>  implies that the proportion of his/her endowment contributed to 
the pool in period  1 t −  by subject i is less than the proportion of the total endowment 
contributed to the pool by the group as a whole. The random effects Tobit regression 
results (see Table 4) show that while the coefficient estimate of  1 it− ∆  is positive and   23
statistically significant for the baseline treatment sessions, it is not statistically significant 
for the large group sessions. One way of interpreting these results is that the subjects care 
about where they stand, relative to the group as a whole, in the small group sessions but 
not in the large group sessions.
 20 
    How do the results from the experiment compare to the complete risk 
sharing prediction? The complete risk sharing outcome is attained when all agents share 
the total resources in every period. Let us define  i
CR V  as the life time discounted utility of 
agent  i under complete risk sharing, 
A
i V  as the life time discounted utility of agent i 
under autarky (where each agent consumes his/her endowment in every period) and 
finally 
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, which is the actual gain (in terms 
of lifetime utility) over that under autarky, as a proportion of the best that they can do, 
which is the gain from complete risk sharing over autarky.  These have been computed 
assuming a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function of the form 
                                                 
20 The data allows us to examine a number of other related issues. First, we looked at the pattern of 
contributions separately for the high and the low endowment subjects. We find that high endowment 
subjects in large groups contribute less to the pool in terms of proportion of their endowment. Additionally 
males receiving low endowment contribute a significantly larger proportion of their endowment to the 
pool, compared to males receiving high endowment. Second, one could argue that it is not the endowment 
received in the particular period rather the pattern of endowment over the lifetime that matters. For 
example, a large number of low endowments over the lifetime can be thought of as an indicator of bad luck 
and that might influence the pattern of contribution. To examine this issue we include in the set of 
explanatory variables the number of low endowments received up to and including the current period. The 
regression results show that an increase in the number of bad draws over the lifetime significantly reduces 
contribution (both in absolute and in terms of proportion) to the pool. These regression results are available 











 with  2 σ =  (most agents are risk averse, see figure 1) and a discount rate 
0.99 β = . Contribution levels are nowhere near what we would obtain under complete 
risk sharing. For the baseline sessions, the actual gain in utility is less than 5% of the 
maximum potential (the benchmark case of complete risk sharing outcome). For the large 
group sessions, for the median subject the observed discounted lifetime utility with the 
transfer scheme is actually lower than that under autarky.  
 
4.2: Effect of Changing the Environment: 
Given that contributions to the pool are nowhere close to what is required to attain a 
Pareto optimal allocation, how could we modify the “environment” to encourage more 
contributions to the pool and hence create incentives for greater mutual insurance and 
risk sharing?  First, one reason for the low contribution might be that subjects do not 
really understand the independent nature of the shocks and therefore those who get a high 
draw suffer from an optimism bias and those who get a low draw think they will get a 
high draw next. One way of getting people to appreciate the downside is to increase the 
probability of receiving a low endowment and examine if that increases contributions. In 
Treatment 3 we increase the probability of receiving a low endowment to 0.7. The 
endowments remain the same, i.e., a subject who receives a low endowment receives 100 
tokens and a low endowment subject receives 20 tokens. The reciprocity argument would 
suggest that contributions in this treatment would be higher, leading to the following 
hypothesis: Hypothesis 3: Contributions to the pool (as a proportion of the endowment) 
will increase when we increase the probability of a low shock.    25
  What should happen if there is no aggregate uncertainty? It is not clear what the 
impact of this change would be. We expect contributions to the pool (and mutual 
insurance) to decrease in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. Aggregate uncertainty 
determines in every period how many subjects in the group would get a low endowment. 
If that number is constant across periods, one component of uncertainty is resolved and 
then subjects have to deal with just individual uncertainty and reciprocal arrangements 
might not be considered as necessary and an important determinant of insurance is the 
relative significance of idiosyncratic to aggregate risk (see Ray, 1998). In Treatment 4 
we have no aggregate uncertainty. All subjects know that in every period there are 
exactly 3 subjects with low endowment.
21  Hypothesis 4: Contributions to the pool, as a 
proportion of the endowment, will decrease in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. 
  What is the effect of increasing the level of inequality between subjects? If 
subjects exhibit inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) 
then we expect contributions to the pool, as a proportion of the endowment, to increase 
as the level of inequality increases.
22 In Treatment 5 we increase the high endowment to 
200, leaving the rest of the parameters unchanged. Specifically we examine the following 
hypothesis: Hypothesis 5: Contributions to the pool, as a proportion of the endowment, 
will increase as the level of inequality increases.  
  In Table 5 we present the regression results for individual behaviour. Note that in 
conducting our regressions we restrict our sample to the small (5 subject) groups as here 
                                                 
21 There is one other problem here. It so happens that compared to the baseline case, two of the parameters 
change: on one hand there is no variation in the aggregate state and second the probability of receiving a 
bad endowment is now 0.6 (greater than 0.5 as in the baseline session). We will need to be careful in 
interpreting the results in this case.   
22 Genicot (2004) shows that for a large range of utility functions a spread-preserving inequality between 
the agents increases the transfers agents make within the constrained optimal agreement.    26
our focus is not on group size effects but on the effect of changing the environment. 
Column 2 presents the Random Effects Tobit regressions for the proportion contributed 
and column 3 presents the Random Effect GLS regressions for (absolute) contributions 
by player i in period t. The explanatory variables are the same as those in Table 3, with 
one difference – here we have three treatment dummies: High Probability of Shock, No 
Aggregate Uncertainty and Increased Inequality. The regression results show that relative 
to the baseline sessions, proportion contributed (but not the amount contributed) is 
significantly lower in sessions with a higher probability of receiving a low endowment 
and in sessions with no aggregate uncertainty, but contribution levels (both in absolute 
terms and in terms of proportions) are significantly higher in sessions with increased 
inequality. Hence Hypothesis 3 is rejected, whereas Hypotheses 4 and 5 receive support 
from the data.  Finally it is worth noting that while contribution levels are no where near 
what we would obtain under complete risk sharing (see Figure 4), subjects always do 
better than under autarky: the actual gain in utility as a proportion of the maximum 
possible is positive. It is also worth noting that in two of the new treatments (no 
aggregate shock and increased inequality) the average actual gain in utility exceeds that 
in the baseline treatment session.      
 
5: Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the relationship between group size and the extent of risk 
sharing in an insurance game played over a number of periods with random idiosyncratic 
and aggregate shocks to income in each period. The complete risk sharing outcome is for 
all agents to place their endowments in a common pool which is then shared equally   27
among members of the group in every period. Theoretically, the larger the group size, the 
smaller the per capita dispersion in income and greater is the potential value of insurance. 
Field evidence however suggests that smaller groups do better than larger groups as far 
as risk sharing is concerned. These often suffer from differences in institutions and risk 
sharing arrangements that hinder comparability across groups. Results from our 
experiments show that the extent of mutual insurance is significantly higher in smaller 
groups, though contributions to the pool are never close to what efficiency requires. 
     Costs to group formation and other informational problems are often argued to 
result in less cohesive behaviour in larger groups. In this laboratory set-up there are no 
costs to group formation and also there are no informational asymmetries per se. Agents 
are typically myopic in nature and they fail to realize the full benefits of risk sharing i.e., 
the fact that contributing to the pool when one receives a high endowment might not 
generate immediate returns but in the long run the benefits in terms of utility gain can be 
substantial (they essentially view the strategic uncertainty as being more than the 
endowment uncertainty). In the short run, any amount placed in the group account yields 
a return of  1
n where n is the group size, while amount placed in the private account 
yields a return of 1. The larger the size of the group, the lower is the short term return 
from contributing to the group account and therefore contributions to the pool are 
significantly lower in the larger groups. Additionally subjects in the large groups appear 
to be hiding behind the veil of anonymity more than those in the small groups.  
  Given that contributions to the pool are not close to what is required to attain 
Pareto Optimal Allocation, how could we change the “environment” to encourage more 
contributions to the pool and hence greater mutual insurance and risk sharing? We   28
examine this issue by: (1) increasing the probability of receiving a low endowment; (2) 
removing aggregate uncertainty and (3) increasing the level of inequality. Our results are 
in line with the a priori theoretical predictions for (2) and (3), but goes in the opposite 
direction for (1). We find that relative to the baseline sessions, proportion contributed is 
significantly lower in sessions with a higher probability of receiving a low endowment 
and in sessions with no aggregate uncertainty but is significantly higher in sessions with 
increased inequality. However contributions to the pool continue to be low. 
   One could argue that the anonymous insurance game that we have implemented 
in this paper is not representative of real-life risk-sharing arrangements which rely on 
unilateral and/or multilateral communication, a variety of kinship ties, peer monitoring as 
well as formal and informal sanctions.
23 However before one can incorporate these 
complexities into the experimental design, one would first have to examine the 
treatments that we have done here by focusing exclusively on behaviour in the presence 
of individual-level and aggregate uncertainty under anonymity and abstracting from more 
complex factors in order to establish a relevant bench-mark. The next step in this 
research therefore, is to examine what kind of formal and informal sanctions or 
communication between participants can work in the insurance game that we have in this 
paper (remember, sanctions and exclusions have costs and must be traded against the 
benefits from not contributing today) and also to examine the properties of the best 
                                                 
23 In the context of public goods experiments it is not clear whether dependence on social sanctions alone 
have a positive effect on contributions to the pool (see for example Noussair and Tucker, 2004 and 
Noussair and Tucker, 2005). On the other hand Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2003) argue that social 
facilitation (effect on performance due to the mere presence of others) can have significant effect on 
behaviour.     29
insurance that is consistent with the requirement that agents with high endowments 
contribute more. This is left for future research.    30
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Table 1: Summary of Treatments 
 






Low Endowment  Probability of 
low endowment 
Number of High 
Endowment 
Subjects 
Baseline (Size = 5) 
 
6  30  100  20  0.5  0 – 5  
Large Group (Size = 25) 
 
2  50  100  20  0.5  0 – 5 
High Probability of Low 
Endowment (Size = 5) 
4  20  100  20  0.7  0 – 5 
No Aggregate Uncertainty (Size = 
5) 
4 20  100  20  0.6 2 
Increased Inequality (Size = 5) 
 
4  20  200  20  0.5  0 – 5 
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Table 2: Selected Descriptive Statistics on Proportion Contributed 
 
Panel A: Average Proportion Contributed by Treatment and Endowment Type (in tokens) 





Baseline    635  0.2009  9.8016 
Large Group   1050  0.0730  3.2962 
High Probability of Low Endowment  470  0.1362  5.1809 
No Aggregate Uncertainty    470  0.1529  6.4426 
Increased Inequality   465  0.1826  14.4774 
 
 
Panel B: Average Proportion Contributed at Different Points in the Game, by Treatment (in tokens) 
Treatment  Period 1  Period 20  Period 1 – 10  Period  





0.3983 0.1467 0.2765 0.1454 0.0289 
Large Group 
 
0.1542 0.0572 0.1007 0.0512 0.0134 
High Probability of 
Low Endowment 
0.2250 0.0405 0.2014 0.0991 0.0557 
No Aggregate 
Uncertainty  
0.2675 0.0600 0.2166 0.1083 0.0987 
Increased  Inequality  0.3350 0.0875 0.2513 0.1393 0.1046 
   34






1/t 0.9067***  11.3053*** 
 (0.1392)  (3.2507) 
Large Group  -0.3952***  -3.7454*** 
 (0.0522)  (0.7618) 
Low Endowment  0.1281***  -4.9595*** 
 (0.0308)  (0.7112) 
-0.0565 -0.8827  Fraction of Low Endowment in the Group = 0.4  
(0.0442) (1.0225) 
-0.0450 -0.3506  Fraction of Low Endowment in the Group = 0.6  
(0.0413) (0.9572) 
-0.1058** -1.6057  Fraction of Low Endowment in the Group = 0.8  
(0.0489) (1.1255) 
0.0335   Proportion Contributed in Previous Period ( ) ,1 it p −  
(0.0670)  
0.4071**   Proportion of Total Endowment Contributed by the Group 
in the Previous Period () 1 t π −   (0.1874)  
-0.1176*** 0.0104  Risk averse 
(0.0451) (0.6919) 
0.0696 -0.9369  Male 
(0.0520) (0.6685) 
-0.0046 -1.9200***  Economics/Commerce/Business Major 
(0.0503) (0.6981) 
 0.3378***  Contribution in the Previous Period () ,1 it c −  
 (0.0238) 
 0.0056  Total Contribution by the Group in the Previous Period 
 (0.0064) 
-0.1675*** 8.9162***  Constant 
(0.0614) (1.1694) 
σu  0.4218*** 0 
  (0.0292)  
σe   0.4096*** 11.3065 
  (0.0151)  
ρ  0.5147  
LR Test of σu = 0  292.45***  
τ    
    
Log Likelihood  -757.7217   
Wald χ
2(11)  197.79*** 456.80*** 
Number of Observations  1605  1605 
Number Uncensored  468   
Number Lower Censored  1060   
Number Upper Censored  77   
Number of Subjects  80  80 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses; ***: Significance at 1%; **: Significance at 5%; *: Significance at 10%   35
Table 4: Random Effect Tobit Regressions by Group Size 
 Baseline  Large  Group 
1/t 0.7709***  0.6854*** 
 (0.2334)  (0.1627) 
Low Endowment  0.1986***  0.0644* 
 (0.0506)  (0.0342) 
Fraction of Low Endowment in the Group = 0.4   -0.0579  -0.0344 
 (0.0703)  (0.0511) 
Fraction of Low Endowment in the Group = 0.6   -0.0514  -0.0279 
 (0.0674)  (0.0465) 
Fraction of Low Endowment in the Group = 0.8   -0.1522*  -0.0601 
 (0.0800)  (0.0535) 
0.6056*** 0.8423*  Proportion Contributed in Previous Period ( ) ,1 it p −  
(0.1991) (0.4688) 
Deviation from Group Average in Previous Period ( ) ,1 it − ∆   0.6637*** 0.4869 
 (0.2139)  (0.4825) 
Risk averse  0.1641  -0.0819 
 (0.1108)  (0.0592) 
Male -0.0085  -0.0813 
 (0.0973)  (0.0861) 
Economics/Commerce/Business Major  -0.2020**  -0.1218* 
 (0.0949)  (0.0647) 
Constant -0.2780**  -0.1857 
 (0.1416)  (0.1135) 
σu  0.3149*** 0.3342*** 
 (0.0517)  (0.0514) 
σe   0.4680*** 0.3257*** 
 (0.0244)  (0.0167) 
ρ  0.3117 0.5130 
LR Test of σu = 0  67.09*** 145.24*** 
Log Likelihood  -396.3374  -351.5866 
Wald χ
2(10)  64.76*** 78.06*** 
Number of Observations  605  1000 
Number Uncensored  243  225 
Number Lower Censored  317  743 
Number Upper Censored  45  32 
Number of Subjects  30  50 
Notes: 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
∆it-1 = Proportion of Total Endowment Contributed by the Group in the Previous Period - Proportion 
Contributed in Previous Period 
   36
 
Table 5: Regression Results. Examining the Effect of Changing the Environment 





1/t 0.7063***  18.5880*** 
 (0.1012)  (3.8801) 
-0.1454*** 0.0689  High Probability of Low Endowment 
(0.0404) (1.2424) 
-0.2815*** 0.0150  No Aggregate Uncertainty 
(0.0446) (1.3279) 
0.2089*** 3.1102***  Increased Inequality 
(0.0406) (1.1495) 
0.1048*** -10.4244***  Low Endowment 
(0.0226) (0.8768) 
-0.0144 -1.3548  Fraction of Low Endowment in the Group = 0.4  
(0.0377) (1.5126) 
0.0044 -2.0853  Fraction of Low Endowment in the Group = 0.6  
(0.0345) (1.3853) 
-0.0655* -2.7523*  Fraction of Low Endowment in the Group = 0.8  
(0.0359) (1.4282) 
-0.0487   Proportion Contributed in Previous Period ( ) ,1 it p −  
(0.0458)  
0.4498***   Proportion of Total Endowment Contributed by the 
Group in the Previous Period () 1 t π −   (0.0884)  
-0.1717*** -1.4480  Risk averse 
(0.0289) (0.8905) 
-0.1086*** -1.5404*  Male 
(0.0299) (0.8385) 
-0.0182 -0.6533  Economics/Commerce/Business Major 
(0.0270) (0.8387) 
 0.2076***  Contribution in the Previous Period () ,1 it c −  
 (0.0243) 
 0.0419***  Total Contribution by the Group in the Previous Period 
 (0.0093) 
-0.0755 11.7809***  Constant 
(0.0473) (1.6129) 
σu  0.3618***  
  (0.0217)  
σe   0.3792*** 16.3846 
  (0.0102)  
ρ  0.4766  
LR Test of σu = 0  370.08***  
Log Likelihood  -1056.3066   
Wald χ
2(13)  304.86*** 500.74*** 
Number of Observations  1950  1950 
Number Uncensored  844   
Number Lower Censored  1015   
Number Upper Censored  91   
Number of Subjects  90  90 
Notes: 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses       
***: Significance at 1%; **: Significance at 5%; *: Significance at 10%    37
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Panel A: Mean Proportion Contributed in the Different Treatments
Low Endowment High Endowment
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Panel B: Mean Contribution in the Different Treatments 
Low Endowment High Endowment
 
 
Treatment: 1=Baseline; 2=Large Group; 3=High Prob of Shock; 4=No Aggregate Shock; 5=Increased Inequality  41



































































1 = Baseline; 2 = Large Group; 3 = High Prob of Shock; 4 = No Aggregate Shock; 5 = Increased Inequality
 